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BOOK REVIEW
How America’s Political Parties Change (And How They Don’t). Michael Barone, New York and London:
Encounter Books, 2019, 130 pp. ISBN 9781641770781. Reviewed by Jack R. Van Der Slik, Professor
of Political Studies and Public Affairs emeritus, University of Illinois Springfield.
Michael Barone is a veteran scholar and commentator on American national politics. He is best
known as an acknowledged expert on Congress, its
members, and their constituencies. He has been
a major author and contributor to The Almanac of
American Politics, published biennially since 1972, a
reference volume of nearly 2000 pages. Since 2001,
Barone has been a contributor to the Fox News
Channel and, since 2009, a senior political analyst
for the Washington Examiner. The Examiner, with
help from Barone, offers a more rightwing perspective on the news of the day than its more widely read
liberal competitor, the Washington Post.
Previewing this book in his “Introduction,”
Barone makes the point that the dynamics of
American presidential elections are occasionally cataclysmic, as in 1860, 1920, and 1932. However, he
notes, “the change in party percentages [by voters]
between 2012 and 2016—or between any presidential election since 1996 and that of 2016— was
minimal by historic patterns” (1). He goes on to say
that what is notable about 2016 is that “The most recent generation of our politics has been characterized
by what I have called polarized partisan parity to an
extent that is arguably unprecedented in American
history” (italics added). Barone celebrates the “yinand-yang” of American diversity, “regionally, economically, religiously, racially and ethnically, culturally—from its colonial beginnings.”
To understand the partisanship of American politics is to appreciate both the fixedness and the adaptability of the two parties locked into a governmental structure with enduring boundaries. Our states
elect presidents with votes in an Electoral College,
apportioned by the numbers of House and Senate
members each state has, based mostly upon population. Our system is largely impervious to third-party
intrusions. Barone characterizes the parties as follows: Democrats have “always been a collection of

out-groups…not…regarded by themselves or others
as typically American but which…make up a majority of the nation. The Republican party has always
been formed around a core group considered to be
typical Americans, but which by itself has never been
a majority of the electorate and must attract others to
the party’s banner in order to win” (9).
Each party has had its streaks of success electing
presidents. From 1897 to 1933, Republicans had six
presidents (McKinley, T. Roosevelt, Taft, Harding,
Coolidge and Hoover). That streak was interrupted
only by Wilson, a Democrat, who won in a threeway race with 42 percent of the vote in 1912. In
a Republican party disruption that year, Teddy
Roosevelt tried to displace his Republican successor, Taft, but both went down to defeat. Reelected
in 1916 with 49 percent of the vote, Wilson won
the war but lost the peace at Versailles, after which
the Republicans reclaimed the presidency for another
dozen years.
In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt put together an
awkward electoral majority. Opponents of the
party of Lincoln, Democrats who held hegemony
in the previously confederate states, joined with
discontented northern voters injured by the Great
Depression under a hapless Herbert Hoover. They
formed a Democratic electoral majority that held
sway for twenty years under only two presidents,
Roosevelt and Harry Truman. The Democratic
streak was interrupted for two terms by a war hero,
Dwight Eisenhower, who was courted by both parties to be its presidential nominee. He chose to run
as a Republican, twice defeating Democrat Adlai
Stevenson. After that interregnum, the Democrats
were restored to the presidency in a close contest
in 1960 (John Kennedy) and a blowout in 1964
(Lyndon Johnson).
Deeply disaffected by the Civil Rights Movement
and disappointed in the Vietnam debacle, south-
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ern Democrats swung to the Republican nominee,
Richard Nixon, in 1968. Nixon prevailed with a
vote-margin of less than one percent of the votes
cast. Nixon won handily in 1972 but was undone
by Watergate. That resulted in his midterm resignation. His appointed Vice President, Gerald Ford, fell
to Jimmy Carter in 1976 by a margin of only two
percent. Carter managed to win just a one-term interruption. In the 1980s, Republicans regained the
presidency for three terms. Ronald Reagan surged to
victory by 9.7 percent in 1980 and 18.2 percent in
1984.
In the eight presidential contests since Reagan,
the margins of victory never reached ten percent.
There has been, as Barone called it, “polarized partisan parity.” Republican George H.W. Bush succeeded Reagan in 1988 with a 5.6 percent voter margin.
Democrat Bill Clinton defeated Bush in 1992 by 5.6
percent and won again in 1996 by 8.5 percent. But
with third-party candidates in the races, Clinton received less than a majority of the popular votes in
both years. Republicans regained the presidency in
2000, scoring an Electoral College win.
George W. Bush trailed his Democratic rival, Al
Gore, by 0.5 percent of the total popular vote. In
2004, Bush was reelected with a 2.5 percent vote
margin. Control of the presidency reverted to the
Democrats in 2008 by a 7.3 percent margin for
Obama, and he was reelected in 2012 with a 3.9 percent voter edge.
In 2016, to the surprise of many commentators,
Donald Trump prevailed by wearing the Republican
label. Democrat Hillary Clinton went down to electoral defeat, despite a 2.9 million popular vote margin over Trump. His portion of the electorate was 2.1
percent less than that of his opponent, the highest
percentage deficit to prevail in presidential electoral
history since the disputed Tilden-Hayes contest in
1876. The Electoral College results were clear, with
304 votes for Trump out of the 538 in play.
Barone identifies the keys to victory this way:
“Of the 100 electoral votes that switched from
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Democratic in 2012 to Republican in 2016, 50 were
in the Midwest—Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin and
Iowa—and 20 were in Pennsylvania…. An additional 29…were in Florida…. One more Democratic to
Republican vote was that of the 2nd congressional district of Maine…” (105).
Barone accounts for the margin of Trump’s electoral vote success by distinguishing between key differences in the political constituencies of these key
states where his electoral votes were achieved. In the
metropolitan areas, most voters supported Clinton,
but in the “outstate” areas Trump prevailed handily. It was the voters in “counties outside those
million plus metro areas…. Donald Trump carried
the outstate Midwest by 57 to 37 percent…. To
be sure, Trump’s victory margins in Michigan and
Wisconsin were exceedingly narrow, as they were
in Pennsylvania, and without the electoral votes of
those three states he would have been defeated. But
he won them and won the Midwest’s electoral votes
by an 88 to 30 margin, the best Republican showing
since the Ronald Reagan landslide of 1984” (115).
Barone’s acute analysis in this book is both intuitive and entertaining. The book recounts telling details of numerous presidential contests and deserves
attention from a wide readership. Bringing his account to a conclusion, he resists making a prediction
on the 2020 election outcome. But of that election
he asserts that “the outstate Midwest could go back
to providing crucial votes in electing Democratic
presidents, as it did for Barack Obama in 2008 and
2012,” thereby resolving the presidential outcome
(118).
With Barone, I will forbear from forecasting a
winner, but I concur with Barone that the voting
results in the Midwest are clearly tractable and may
well be determinative for the coming—and likely
close—presidential election. Judging from Barone’s
insights and analysis, most of the voters who read Pro
Rege reside at the cutting-edge where the next presidential outcome will become a settled matter.

